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Theoretically, this paper draws on political agency theory to formulate hypotheses. Empirically, it 
shows that political institutions have a role in explaining the prevalence of political corruption in 
American states. In the states, a set of democracies where the rule of law is relatively well 
established and the confounding effects of differing electoral systems and regimes are absent, 
institutional variables relating to the openness of the political system inhibit corruption. That is, 
other things equal, the extent to which aspiring politicians can enter and gain financial backing, and 
to which voters can focus their votes on policies and thereby hold incumbent politicians accountable 
for policy outcomes and find substitutes for them if dissatisfied with those outcomes, reduce 
corruption as a general problem of agency. These institutional effects are estimated in the presence 
of controls for variables representing other approaches.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Corruption is high on the current research agenda in political science and economics. While 
corruption has long been thought to be a major issue in development, it is only recently that 
broader, systematic empirical work on the causes and consequences of corruption has begun to 
emerge. For example, Mauro (1995) demonstrates empirically some detrimental effects of 
corruption on growth and investment. Lambsdorff (1999) reviews related research on the 
relationship between corruption and the informal sector, receipt of foreign direct investment, and 
public provision of health and education, among other things. 
This paper examines the relationship between institutions and corruption in American 
states. The paper has two main purposes. First, as part of an ongoing project, we link corruption 
with our previous work on fiscal transparency, accountability, government trust, and the size of 
government (Alt, Lassen and Skilling, 2002), to understand the interplay of these forces at the state 
government level. Second, we use the American states for comparative political examination of the 
effects of institutions and politics on the prevalence of corruption, in order to combine past theory 
and empirical work on corruption.
2 A value of using the states is that we can hold some legal 
institutions constant while also avoiding many unobservable differences in culture and institutions 
that exist across countries. On the other hand, there are enough cases and sufficient heterogeneity in 
institutions and socioeconomic conditions to allow tests of leading conjectures and explanations of 
corruption. We show at several points how these conjectures relate to and are influenced, even 
inspired, by Mancur Olson’s work. Along the way, we also discuss the need to distinguish between 
rent seeking and corruption and collect in a systematic way several available measures of corruption 
in American states. 
However, there is no commonly agreed-upon theoretical approach on which to base an 
empirical model of corruption, let alone to investigate the causes of corruption. While other 
classifications are possible, we take note of six different approaches to explaining corruption. Each 
of these has a different core of explanatory concepts and variables. They include: 
1)  Socio-demographics (a historical and structural approach);  
2)  The size of government, bureaucracy, and rent-seeking;  
3)  Exposure to competition; 
                                                 
2  Previous studies of corruption in the states include Meier and Holbrooke (1992), who examine empirically a ten-year 
average from 1977 –87 of the proportion of public officials convicted for violating laws against public corruption. Goel 
and Nelson (1998) investigate the effect of size and composition of government budgets on a similar measure of 




4) Regulatory  burden  and intrusiveness; 
5)  Observability, transparency, and trust; and  
6)  Electoral institutions.  
To start with, socio-demographic and cultural factors associated with the extent of 
corruption (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Klitgaard et al., 2000; Treisman, 2000) include urbanism 
(corruption thrives in cities), education (corruption is lower where the population is more educated), 
and income (corruption is lower in richer societies). But Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufman, 
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) show why the relationship of corruption and income is causally 
ambiguous: are more corrupt countries poorer or poorer countries more corrupt, or less able to fight 
corruption? Treisman’s thorough cross-national empirical examination shows some effects of 
cultural variables like religion and also finds less corruption in more open economies and countries 
with common law systems (read: a history of British rule). Husted (1999) examines whether more 
inequality produces more corruption. Meier and Holbrooke (1992) demonstrate the effects of 
average education and urban concentration on corruption in US states. 
Next, as for example Olson (1982) argues, specialized interests that manifest 
themselves as interest groups tend to decrease efficiency as preferential treatment dissipates 
resources, leading to larger government and lower growth (Lambsdorff 2002; Sobel and Garrett 
2002).  Government intervention that requires the use of bureaucrats to make decisions also opens 
up possibilities for bureaucratic corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Acemoglu and Verdier 
2000), though power to special interests could also show up as inefficient policies being adopted by 
legislatures rather than as bureaucratic corruption. In this broad public choice tradition are many 
empirical studies that link corruption (and the temptation to act corruptly) to the extent of public 
employment, salaries, and government scale (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1978); to 
the extent of redistribution or transfers (La Porta et al 1999); and to federalism (Treisman 2000) and 
decentralization of government (Fisman and Gatti 2002 a,b), the latter of which relates directly to 
American states. 
The lack of competition among interest groups that Olson (1982) attacked reflects a 
third, long-standing, argument. In this view competition affects corruption, since exposure to 
economic competition inhibits rent-seeking by firms or interest groups. Ades and Di Tella (1999), 
echoed in Treisman (2000), find empirically that corruption increases in the presence of rents in the 
form of fuel and mineral exports, trade distance, and a lack of import competition. For other recent 




informed, closely contested elections can “produce a world in which corruption is limited by 
competition” (Rose-Ackerman 1978, p. 213). Another “exposure to alternatives” argument is the 
effect of unbundling issues in citizen politics (Besley and Coate 2000). In the competition between 
politicians and citizens, unbundling relatively empowers citizens. In much the same way, the extent 
of competition among politicians between incumbents and entrants, argue Persson and Tabellini 
(2002) depends on district magnitudes (the number of candidates elected from a district) or limited 
monopolization of contributions (Rose-Ackerman 1999) that lower barriers to entry. In cross-
sections of countries, showing how institutions that expose politicians to competition produce less 
corruption has often involved comparing democracies to autocracies (Montinola and Jackman 2002; 
a point also related to Olson 1993).  
Fourth, however, in quite a different way Olson, in Power and Prosperity, argues that 
"one reason why many societies have a lot of corruption in government is that they prescribe 
outcomes that all or almost all private parties have an incentive to avoid ...." (Olson 2001, p. 107; 
see also Olson 1998). The context of that quotation makes clear that Olson is thinking (projecting 
our way of thinking onto him) of a predictive regression with corruption on the left hand side and a 
variable called "extent of regulation" on the right. He says "regulation that is market contrary must 
leave all or almost all parties with an incentive to evade the law" (same page) and that is right below 
a discussion of governments setting quantities and prices. Olson’s argument finds some empirical 
support in the recent article by Djankov et al. (2002), who show that a greater number of 
procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally 
is associated with higher levels of corruption (see also Kaufman and Wei 1999). Knack (2002) 
discusses the quality of US state public management and government in ways that is similar to this 
approach.  
Institutions feature surprisingly little in the analysis of corruption, even though 
institutions are widely regarded as a key element in structuring incentives and information 
transmission to agents in the political and economic arena. One connection between corruption and 
institutions -- the fifth approach in this review -- lies in (lack of) transparency. Transparent 
procedures foster coordination and durable self-enforcing collective institutions (Ostrom 1990) and 
lend credibility, improving performance of the”stationary bandit” (Olson 1993). In the same way, a 
free press (Brunetti and Weder 2003) or unbribeable media (Besley and Prat 2001) inhibits 
corruption, resulting in increased trustworthiness of government (LaPorta et al 1997). Budget 




government in the US states (Alt, Lassen, and Skilling 2002). The effects of transparency are also 
causally ambiguous: transparency might increase the detection of corrupt acts, or reduce corruption 
when the expectation of being observed in corrupt acts is sufficiently internalized. On the other 
hand, since Alt, Lassen, and Skilling (2002) show that transparency increases the scale of 
government, it could also increase temptation in line with the argument in (2) above and thus 
indirectly increase corruption.  
The final approach we consider, also explicit about institutions affect corruption, is an 
agency-theoretic model (Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2001). They predict and empirically 
demonstrate significant effects of electoral institutions such as proportional vs. majoritarian 
systems, district magnitude, and list voting on the scale and distribution of rents and favors and thus 
the prevalence of corruption, in a cross-country setting. Large districts inhibit while proportional 
representation increases rent-seeking and thus corruption. Persson and Tabellini (2002) also deal 
with presidentialism, which they associate with less corruption.   
We build on this political agency theory to formulate new conjectures about the effect 
of institutions on the prevalence of political corruption in American states. In the empirical part of 
the project, a significant goal is also to design cross-state analyses including control variables that 
reflect and relate to findings from each of the other five approaches reviewed above. On the whole, 
as we describe below, we are able to do this. Indeed, to our knowledge, ours is the first study to 
relate corruption in US states to measures reflecting the last three, and maybe the last four 
approaches. Moreover, the approaches are not mutually exclusive, and interestingly we find some 
evidence that supports all of them. The next section defines corruption and raises some issues about 
models of political rents, rent seeking and corruption in the context of political agency models. 
Section three presents our theory and hypotheses, section four our empirical work, and section five 
discusses the results. 
 
2. Defining corruption 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon, but has existed as long as government. Indeed, Brooks (1909) 
claimed that “in the whole vocabulary of politics it would be difficult to point out any single term 
that is more frequently employed than the word ‘corruption.’ ” However, not only is there no 
common theoretical approach to modeling corruption, but also there exists no common, agreed 
upon, definition of corruption. We need to clarify first exactly what we mean by corruption, and 




In this paper, we follow Treisman (2000) in defining corruption as the misuse of 
public office for private gains. This has some important implications. Implicit behind many of the 
models and approaches above is a distinction between a political rents approach (as in Persson, 
Tabellini and Trebbi, 2001) and a compensation approach (for instance, Ades and di Tella, 1999). A 
political rents approach, built on models of political agency and focused on political agents, asks 
how the political system and political institutions affect the prevalence of political corruption, based 
on models of political rents, or rent-seeking. This is distinct from a compensation approach that 
considers the relation between government and the bureaucracy, and the factors that affect the 
remuneration of bureaucrats. Thus, it concerns bureaucratic or administrative corruption, say of tax 
collectors and regulatory agencies, rather than corruption of political officials (political corruption). 
  The three studies mentioned in the previous paragraph focus their empirical work on 
cross-national differences in subjective measures of overall corruption, which (by definition) 
includes both bureaucratic and political corruption. However, relating their models to empirical data 
entails two (implicit) assumptions. First, bureaucratic corruption must be positively correlated with 
political corruption. This assumption is at least partly validated empirically (on cross-national data) 
by the high correlation between perceptions of corruption by politicians and public administrators in 
a Gallup International Survey reported in Lambsdorff (2000).  
The other assumption is that rent-seeking by politicians must be positively correlated 
with political corruption. This assumption requires some additional considerations. A number of 
both theoretical and empirical papers in the economics literature take as their starting point models 
of political rents. It is not clear, however, that such rents are illegal (i.e. corruption) rather than legal 
(rent-seeking). For example, when Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2001) review the predictions of 
political agency literature they build on Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) 
regarding the effects of institutions on the level of political rents. However, when testing the model 
empirically they measure this rent extraction with a number of common corruption indices.  
  However, this fails to distinguish ordinary special interest politics (what political 
scientists consider the use of office) from political corruption (the misuse of office). Special interest 
politics is, within limits, legal and part of the political process, as are campaign contributions, while 
corruption is illegal.
3 Often, special interest politics, or the use of office more generally, has to do 
with broad categories; for example, that certain favors are granted to an industry, but that firms 
                                                 
3 The line of demarcation is often unclear. For example, Stigler (1971) considers regulators enacting regulation with the 
sole purpose of receiving contributions or bribes from firms; in later literature this is considered rent-seeking. See also 




within the industry are treated equally. Corruption, on the other hand, typically has to do with 
special treatment of particular firms, or individuals. Furthermore, Grossman and Helpman (2001, 
pp. 225-6) distinguishes corruption from special interest politics by noting that while the former 
involves an explicit quid pro quo, the latter is characterized by a tacit understanding between special 
interest groups and politicians that campaign contributions are allocated to politicians sympathetic 
to the groups’ causes. 
  Theoretically, then, we can distinguish political rent seeking from corruption. 
However, it is not obvious how to do this empirically. Also it is not clear that the correlation 
between a legal and an illegal activity (rent-seeking and corruption) would be very strong, or even 
positive, in contrast to the likely correlation between two illegal acts (two types of corruption). In 
the empirical analysis below, we include various measures of interest group activity as a potential 
determinant of corruption, but perhaps interest group activity should be thought of independently 
from corruption. Ideally, if a measure of rent-seeking could be obtained, it would be possible to 
compare the extent of rent-seeking with perceived corruption levels. This would enable empirical 
validation of the implicit assumption in Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2001) that political rent-
seeking and corruption are positively correlated.
4 Below, we follow Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
(2001) in employing political agency models to suggest testable hypotheses about the effects of 
institutions and political variables on perceived levels of corruption, so readers should keep in mind 
this warning about the difference between model and data. 
 
3. Theory and Related Literature 
How do institutions and other characteristics of the political system influence the incentives for 
rent-seeking and corruption by political officials? We answer these questions within a model of 
political agency. As Barro (1973) pointed out, voters and politicians are engaged in a principal-
agent relationship. Voters, the principals, choose a politician, the agent, who in turn rules the 
principals. The premise of such agency models is that interests of voters and politicians are not 
perfectly aligned, so the authority given to politicians creates scope for actions that voters dislike. 
We build on a generic model of political agency, in the tradition of Ferejohn (1986) or 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997). To capture the idea that votes and politicians have conflicting 
interests, we simply assume that voters pay taxes to finance public goods provision by the 
                                                 
4 Sobel and Garrett (2002) seek to measure the extent of rent-seeking by the difference in industry structure between 
state capital areas and non-capital areas; this could in principle be included as a measure of rent seeking; we leave this 




politician, and that the politician extracts rents from the tax revenue collected leaving less funds for 
public goods. Hence, voter utility is decreasing in the amount of rents extracted.  
The politician’s objective is to maximize the sum of current and future rents. In 
reduced form, the preferences of the incumbent politician can be written as 
  () () ( ) ,
P P U ru rp r V χ δ =+  
where 
P U is the politician’s expected utility. This depends positively both on currents rents, r, as 
well as on expected future rents,  () ,
P pr V χ δ , where  () , prχ  is the probability of being reelected 
or reappointed and 
P V δ  is the politician’s discounted continuation value, reflecting expected future 
utility if in office. A crucial assumption of the political agency literature is that the probability of 
being reelected depends negatively on the amount of rents extracted. The variable χ captures 
factors that influence or indicate the possibility of holding politicians accountable for the rent 
extraction, such as barriers to entry into politics and the resulting level of political competition.  
The intuition of the model is as follows. Politicians enjoy utility from rents, at the 
expense of voters. Voters, in turn, respond by conditioning their votes on the amount of rents 
extracted. If the current level of rents is deemed ‘too high’ by voters, they vote the incumbent 
politician out of office. The simple trade-off facing incumbent politicians, then, is that more rents 
now decreases the probability of being in office in the next period. From the politician’s point of 
view, the optimal level of rents balances this trade-off, so that the politician extracts the level of 
rents that makes voters just indifferent about reelection. 
Indeed, a central figure in the political agency literature is the retrospective voter who 
conditions the vote on the observed outcome of a policy process in which there is asymmetric 
information. The key focus of the literature has been how institutions and information interact to 
affect voters’ possibilities for holding politicians accountable for their rent extraction, since this is a 
major influence on the incentives faced by politicians. When institutions differ over political 
jurisdictions we should expect to see differences in the extent of rent-seeking and corruption across 
these jurisdictions. Therefore, we next derive hypotheses about the effect of different institutions on 
the level of rent-seeking and corruption. Most of these results can be rationalized from the simple 
reduced-form above, though we build on ideas formulated in slightly differing models. 
Myerson (1993) characterizes the possibilities for voting corrupt politicians out of 
office under alternative electoral regimes and finds that holding politicians accountable for corrupt 




analysis of proportional vs. plurality voting cannot be applied directly to the case of American 
states, but the logic extends to other factors determining the scope for political accountability.
5 For 
example, the extant degree of political competition suggests how difficult it is to vote an incumbent 
out of office. If political competition is low, it is possible for politicians to increase rents without 
getting thrown out of office (see, for example, Lassen, 2000).  
While the degree of political competition is often used as an independent variable on 
its own, it is arguably an endogenous outcome of political institutions. In particular, institutions 
governing who is selected to run for office can affect the menu of choices available to voters. A key 
feature of candidate selection is the primary process, which varies considerably across states. In 
closed primaries, voters have to declare a party affiliation some time before the primary, whereas in 
open primaries, voters can participate without such a declaration. As noted by Gerber and Morton 
(1998), closed primaries increase the influence of party elites. This, we argue, reduces the scope for 
popular accountability that, in turn, makes it possible for incumbents to increase corruption without 
getting voted out of office. 
Similarly, the level of political competition can be affected by campaign finance 
restrictions. Incumbents generally have fund raising advantages over opponents (Alexander, 1991) 
and, hence, allowing for unlimited campaign expenditures can make it more difficult for opponents 
to challenge incumbents. Thus, we would expect restrictions on campaign expenditures to be 
associated with lower barrier to entry and, therefore, lower levels of corruption. 
Above, we argued that if the incumbent was ‘too sure’ of continuing in office, 
corruption would be high. The converse can also be true. If the incumbent is almost certain not to 
have a next period, for example due to term limits (in which case  0 p =  regardless of r), nothing is 
lost in terms of reelection possibilities by increasing rents, or not combating corruption. Besley and 
Case (1995) show that economic policy choices by lame duck governors -- governors who cannot 
run next time due to term limits - are different from those who have a reputation to sustain.
6 In 
particular, lame duck governors are associated with larger governments and smaller reactions to 
                                                 
5 See Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2001) for an analysis of other barriers of entry into politics in a cross-national 
context. However, note that when their model is tested in a cross-section of countries, the relationships among 
presidentialism, plurality, and district size are subtle, but all US states are “presidential”, all have plurality systems, and 
none have list voting. That leaves district size that in this model measures barriers to candidate entry. While the states 
generally elect one candidate per district, as we shall see below they vary in other ways that reflect barriers to candidate 
entry: the structure of primary elections and limitations on campaign contributions, for example. 
6 In a recent update of their previous work, Besley and Case (2002), this effect is somewhat weaker. Of course, 




natural disasters. The same reasoning applies in our context. Governors and legislators who are not 
up for reelection care less, other things equal, about electoral sanctions due to corruption.
7 
Finally, institutions reducing the dimensionality of the policy space improve voters’ 
possibilities for holding politicians accountable for their performance, leading to less rents and 
corruption. Ferejohn (1986, 1999) observed that achieving accountability is harder in a 
multidimensional policy space, as different voters would use their one vote on performance in 
different policy dimensions, destroying the coordination of voters necessary for performance voting 
to be effective. Besley and Coate (2000) argue that representative democracy “bundles” issues, so 
policy outcomes on non-salient issues may diverge far from the wishes of a majority of voters (see 
also Dahl, 1956), since people have only one vote. The role of initiatives is to permit an 
“unbundling” of issues, forcing a closer relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes 
on these issues. Other things equal, separating out a number of issues to be voted on through 
initiatives (or by referendum) effectively “frees” the party vote to be used for other things like 
retrospective economic voting, disciplining the incumbent’s rent-seeking (Ferejohn, 1986; Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini, 1997),
8 so the possibility of voter initiatives, other things equal, should 
increase accountability while decreasing rents.  
Summing up, straight from a generic political agency model, we expect that open 
primaries, some campaign finance restrictions, and electoral competition more generally, as well as 
provisions for voter initiatives
9 should decrease corruption, while the presence of term limits should 
increase corruption. Other predictions that can be related to agency models include the effects of 




In the cross-country literature (for example Mauro 1995; Ades and di Tella 1999; Treisman 2000), 
corruption is measured by subjective indices or by combinations of such indices. International for-
profit consultancy firms, such as Political Risk Services and the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
produce the subjective indices. These are then used, for example, by Transparency International, a 
                                                 
7 Peters and Welch (1980) report that congressional candidates typically lose around 6-11 % of votes if they are found 
to be corrupt, which, however, seldom is enough to make them lose the election.  
8 Direct democracy is often used where policy issues are value-based and cross party lines (see Matsusaka, 1992). 
9 Feldman (1998) suggests a model in which voter initiatives provide interest groups with an outside option in their 
bargaining vis-à-vis legislators. Essentially, Feldman argues that introducing voter initiatives implies no change in the 
policy adopted from an assumption of efficient bargaining. However, it leads to lower campaign contributions, higher 
rents to interest groups and less rents to politicians. Observationally, we cannot distinguish the agency explanation from 




German-based NGO, for estimation of their compound index, the widely used Corruption 
Perceptions Index.  
In the US, Boylan and Long (2002) provide similar subjective assessments. They 
conducted a survey of state house reporters’ perception of public corruption in their state in 1998. 
State house reporters were asked to rate their state in terms of level of corruption of all government 
employees (including elected officials, political appointees, and civil servants), on a scale from 1 to 
7 (least corrupt to most corrupt). The average of “local” reporters’ opinions for each state is used as 
the variable measuring corruption, and is the dependent variable in our research. The three most 
corrupt states, according to this measure, are Rhode Island, Louisiana, and New Mexico (so there is 
some face validity here), while the three least corrupt are Colorado, North Dakota and South 
Dakota. As for some additional data, the complete list of sources and detail on coding is given in the 
appendix. 
As an alternative to survey data, prosecution data from the criminal justice system 
exists. In fact, past empirical literature on corruption in the US states has been based on federal 
prosecutions and the number of public officials convicted. Meier and Holbrooke (1992) and Goel 
and Nelson (1998) use the proportion of public officials convicted for “abuse of public trust” (the 
ratio of officials convicted to the number of public officials). The correlation between the Meier-
Holbrooke measure (which was an average over 1977-87) and the results of the Boylan-Long 
survey is high and positive at 0.64 (p = .000). However, as Boylan and Long (2002) point out, while 
federal prosecution data does provide valuable information about corruption by state, the number of 
prosecutions is a function not only of the level of corruption, but also of the priority, or amount of 
effort devoted to prosecution of public officials, which also varies by state. The number of public 
officials convicted also includes convictions unrelated to corruption. More recent measures,
10 
though not directly comparable, report the number of federal defendants, by state, on bribery and 
political corruption charges, but these suffer from similar problems with respect to state level effort 
as the Meier-Holbrooke measure. For these reasons we concentrate on the survey data, rather than  
use the number of prosecutions as a proxy for the level of corruption. 
 
                                                 
10 The newer data are available through the U.S. Department of Justice website. Boylan and Long (2002) show that the 
corruption survey variable we employ here predicts the number of federal corruption prosecutions, even after allowing 




5. Empirical analysis 
Empirical Specification 
Estimating models of corruption is not without problems. Treisman (2000) notes the large number 
of potential explanatory variables, often correlated with each other, as well as problems arising from 
potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. Our focus on American states allows us to keep 
fixed a number of factors that are often controlled – or left unaccounted – for in cross-national 
studies. Nevertheless, the number of hypotheses about institutional effects on the prevalence of 
corruption set out in the theoretical section above is high. Including few explanatory variables at a 
time risks omitted variable bias, but testing all hypotheses in one specification makes it problematic 
to distinguish between them if the data does not contain sufficient variation (Treisman, 2000). 
Similarly, while we consider theoretically only the causes of corruption, the 
consequences of corruption have also been widely studied and, indeed, are part of the rationale for 
examining the causes in the first place.  For example, Mauro (1995) reports a negative relationship 
between growth and corruption, which in our case could mean that higher levels of per capita 
income could be a consequence, rather than a cause, of lower corruption. Empirically, the existence 
of a causal link from corruption to some of our explanatory variables can also bias the results. We 
touch upon the issue when discussing the robustness of our empirical results below.  
Our approach is to start out with a base regression, including four core variables and 
then add variables one-by-one. Thereafter, we consider a larger regression, to see which effects hold 
up when all hypotheses are accounted for simultaneously. The four core variables capture the four 
commonly made assertions about the prevalence of corruption in the historical-structural approach 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999; Klitgaard et al. 2000; Treisman 2000) that (i) corruption thrives in cities; 
(ii) corruption is lower in richer societies; (iii) corruption is lower when the population is more 
educated; (iv) corruption increases with the size of the public budget. In the states we measure these 
with the share of state population in metropolitan areas, state real income per capita, the share of 
population with a high school diploma or better, and the size of government measured as general 
tax revenue in real per capita terms. The regressions include forty-five states, excluding Alaska and 
Hawaii as these are outliers in many dimensions of the data, and New Hampshire, New Jersey and 
Massachusetts due to missing data on corruption. We estimate the model by OLS with robust 
standard errors. 





Table 1 shows the result of the core regression of state house reporters’ perception of corruption on 
the four variables mentioned above. The four core variables together explain 57 percent of the 
variation in corruption, and they are all significant at the 95 or 99 percent level with the expected 
signs. 
< Table 1 about here > 
The finding that larger governments are associated with higher perceived corruption 
parallels that of Goel and Nelson (1998), who find that high-spending governments are associated 
with more convictions per government employee, controlling for resources spent on law 
enforcement.
11 To get an idea of the magnitude of the estimated effects, a 10 percentage-point 
increase in the share of the population with high school diploma, which is about half the difference 
between the minimum and maximum values observed, decreases corruption perceptions almost by 
one standard deviation. Similarly, increasing real government revenue per capita by 900 dollars 
(three standard deviations) increases perceived corruption by, roughly, one standard deviation. 
We now turn to testing the institutional hypotheses derived above, as well as a number 
of the alternatives presented in the introduction. Table 2 shows the empirical results. The table 
reports separate regressions, such that each row adds an additional control variable (or, in some 
cases, a number of variables) to the core regression, the results of which are always robust to the 
inclusion of these additional variables.
12 Many interesting results emerge. First, we look at the 
predictions from the simple agency model. Regression (1) examines whether statutory gubernatorial 
term limits affect corruption. The coefficient on term limits has the expected sign, suggesting that 
statutory term limits tend to increase corruption, but with a p-value of .20 it is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, we get the expected (negative) sign on political competition, measured by 
Holbrooke and van Dunk’s (1993) district level competition variable (regression (2)), but this is far 
from significant. Note, however, that both the term limits indicator variable as well as the measure 
of political competition are strongly correlated with the education variable (the percent of the 
population with high school diploma) so that they are in fact significant when the education variable 
is omitted from the estimating equation. 
< Table 2 about here > 
                                                 
11 Further, our finding is independent of various ways to measure taxes and spending. 
12 Throughout, the results are robust to the inclusion of an indicator variable for Southern states. While often included in 




Regression (3) includes an indicator for open primaries. We hypothesized above that 
open primaries should be associated with lower barriers to entry and, hence, greater scope for 
holding politicians accountable. The results suggest that this may be the case: open primaries are 
empirically associated with lower corruption, significant at the 90 % level. This echoes the findings 
of Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2001) on a cross-country sample that lower barriers to entry in 
politics are associated with lower corruption. 
  Regressions (4) to (6) examine the effect of voter initiatives. Regression (5) finds that 
the possibility of initiatives decreases corruption, but that this effect is smaller, the higher is the 
percentage of signatures required for an initiative. Both of these are significant at the 95 percent 
level. Regression (6) looks instead at the average use of initiatives per cycle since year of adoption, 
and finds similar results. Finally, following Hug (2001), regression (7) splits initiatives into two 
categories, including direct initiatives (that can be put directly on ballot), and indirect initiatives 
(that require approval of the legislature). We find that it is only direct initiatives that matter; the 
coefficients are significant at the 99 % level. This is consistent with our conjecture that voter 
initiatives increase the scope for political accountability by ‘unbundling’ the voting decision. 
Finally, we consider the effects of campaign finance restrictions and fiscal 
transparency. Campaign expenditures restriction, by and on behalf of a candidate, are associated 
significantly with lower corruption. One possible reason could, as noted above, be that campaign 
expenditure restrictions counter the incumbents’ advantage in fund raising and, thus, serve to level 
the playing field by lowering entry barriers for opponents. Conversely, fiscal transparency (see Alt, 
Lassen and Skilling, 2002) is associated with higher levels of corruption. Empirically, this means 
that increased transparency increases detection of corrupt acts, at least more than internalizing the 
expectation of more detection leads politicians to avoid corrupt acts.
13 Also, the direction of 
causation could be from corruption to fiscal transparency. In more corrupt states, there might be 
higher pressure, at least from voters, for more transparent budget institutions.  
Having examined the hypotheses from the agency model, which represent approaches 
five and six identified in the introduction, we turn to the alternative approaches. We begin by 
looking at the second approach, which has to do with rent-seeking and the size of government. As 
noted above, following Olson (1982) specialized interests, manifested as interest groups, will tend 
to decrease efficiency. Gray and Lowery (1996) provide the total number of interest groups and the 
concentration of interest groups in particular policy areas, calculated as a Herfindahl index. We 
                                                 
13 A smaller, indirect effect of transparency, is that by increasing government scale (Alt, Lassen, and Skilling 2002) it 




adjust the number of interest groups for state size by regressing it on state population and using the 
residuals from this regression, capturing deviations from the trend, as independent variables. As can 
be seen from regressions (8) and (9), we find no significant effects of the interest group variables, 
though both the number and the degree of concentration of interest groups tend to increase 
corruption. However, we return to this issue below. 
Similarly, we find no significant effects of the share of federal transfers to total state 
revenue. Federal transfers appear with a negative sign, in contrast to Fisman and Gatti (2002b) who 
found positive and significant effects. One plausible reason for this discrepancy could be their use 
of prosecution data, rather than the survey employed here. Further, we find no significant effects of 
decentralization of state revenues (regression 11), measured by local government revenues relative 
to total state and local government revenues. Nevertheless, the coefficient has the expected sign, 
and thus partly confirms Fisman and Gatti’s (2002a) cross-country results. Finally, we include a 
measure of relative wages in the public sector. A recurring theme in the development economics 
literature on corruption is that efficiency wages will tend to reduce corruption, as higher-than-
average public sector wages will make being fired due to corruption more costly. Regression (12) 
reports a negative and significant coefficient on the average state government wage, measured 
relative to per capita state income. Thus, we find fairly strong evidence, controlling for income level 
and public sector size, that relative public sector wages matter: where average wages are higher, 
corruption is lower. 
  Does excessive regulation cause corruption? Stigler (1971) suggested that often the 
very reason for implementing regulation was the possibility of extracting bribes from firms and 
interest groups. In an impressive study, Djankov et al. (2002) find on a cross-country sample that 
various measures of entry regulation are positively correlated with levels of corruption. To the best 
of our knowledge, however, no comparable measure exists for American states. As an imperfect 
proxy, we include the so-called Small Business Survival Index (2002), an index constructed every 
year by the Small Business Survival Committee (2002). The index includes taxation, health and 
worker regulations and a number of other factors of influence to small business, and is organized 
such that higher values of the index are reflects more regulation and higher taxes. We find the index 
to be signed as expected, but nowhere near significant. As an alternative, we include the number of 
public employees per 100 residents to capture the idea that more regulation, other things equal, will 




positive and strongly significant. But given the size of the “wage bill” in government consumption, 
it is not clear whether we are measuring regulation or the effect of size of government. 
  Finally, we look at the effects of trust and transparency. Alt, Lassen and Skilling 
(2002) show that higher budget transparency increases government size and public approval of 
government. However, as noted above, in this context budget transparency is associated, though not 
significantly, with a higher degree of corruption. As noted above, one possible reason could be that 
more transparency can increase the size of government (Ferejohn, 1999) that in turn can increase 
the temptation for corruption. Alternatively, we can look at other proxies for good governance. As 
argued by Knack (2002), social capital can influence the quality of government. In his empirical 
analysis, Knack uses the percent of the population reporting Scandinavian ancestry as an instrument 
for measures of social capital. In regression (16) we include it directly, and find that in states with 
more people reporting Scandinavian ancestry corruption is significantly lower and the fit of the 
regression improves substantially. Finally, we include a measure of the strength of the Progressive 
movement, which had combating corruption as a central part of their agenda. We include an 
indicator variable for states that have had a Progressive governor and find that these states generally 
have lower corruption. 
In sum, we find that many predictions, both from the agency theoretic framework and 
from other approaches, are not rejected by the data. However, our testing of the models has so far 
been partial, in the sense that potential explanatory variables have been included one-by-one (while 




Based on the results reported in Table 2, we now include a larger number of explanatory variables. 
Table 3 reports the results. We first include variables from the political agency framework that were 
significant in Table 2 above: direct initiatives, campaign expenditure restrictions and open 
primaries. The results, presented in the first column, roughly correspond to those obtained above. In 
particular, direct initiatives, with a correction for thresholds, campaign expenditure restrictions and 
open primaries continue to be significantly associated with lower corruption, though income per 
capita ceases to be significant. The next column reports results with the full set of political agency 




neither of the additional variables are significant, and in this case the effect of open primaries is 
slightly less precisely estimated.
14 
< Table 3 about here > 
The third column reports the results when the additional significant explanatory 
variables from Table 2 are added to the regression of column one, thus including all significant 
variables from Table 2 in one regression. Most of the results hold up, while some are slightly 
weaker than when included on their own. In particular, the effects of open primaries, relative public 
sector salaries, number of public employees and Scandinavian ancestry are less precisely estimated, 
though no results seem to have been altered fundamentally. Furthermore, the final result (fourth 
column), shows that if we add to this regression the number of interest groups corrected for size and 
the Small Business Survival Indicator, these variables are actually strongly significant with the 
expected positive signs, and at the same time this inclusion reestablishes the significance of both 
public sector wages and Scandinavian ancestry. We conclude that correlations among the 
explanatory variables as well as bias from omitting relevant explanatory variables create some 
problems of inference at the margin, but the broad contours of the results are clear. The variables, 
derived from agency theory, that reflect ease of political entry and exposure of incumbents to 
competition (initiatives and their thresholds, campaign expenditure restrictions, and possibly open 
primaries) reveal their expected effects.  This is true even after we control for structural variables 
(urbanism, education, less clearly income), the public choice approach (government scale, relative 
public sector salaries, number of interest groups adjusted for size), and regulatory burden (the small 
business index).  
An issue often raised – but only rarely addressed – in empirical analyses of corruption 
is the problem of reverse causation. For example, it is not clear a priori whether higher income 
‘buys’ better institutions including lower corruption, the cross-country literature on political 
institutions argues, or whether it is corruption that is the cause of low income levels and growth. To 
find suitable instruments is often difficult, as is instrumenting all potentially endogenous variables. 
However, to explore the problem of potential endogeneity, we instrument our income variable with 
the level of income in 1950. These are highly correlated, 1950 income explaining more than 50 per 
cent of the variation in current income. In results like those in Table 3 but not separately reported, 
we find that including an instrument this way makes income insignificant, both in the base case 
                                                 
14 As noted above, part of the explanation for the insignificance of competition and term limits is collinearity with the 





regression as well as in the subsequent results presented above. It does not, however, have any 
impact on the estimates and levels of significance for the other variables. That the income variable 
is not robust to employing an instrumental variables approach is perhaps less surprising given the 
relative lack of robustness of that variable in the comprehensive regressions presented in Table 3. 
We leave exploring other consequences of endogeneity for future work. 
 
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
First and foremost, this paper makes the point that political institutions have a role in explaining the 
prevalence of political corruption. The inhibiting effects of having a limited number of observations 
and only a single cross-sectional measure of corruption as well as interrelationships among the 
explanatory variables, make sweeping claims about results inappropriate. But it appears clear in the 
data that in the US states, a set of democracies where the rule of law is relatively well established 
and the confounding effects of differing electoral systems and regimes are absent, institutional 
variables relating to the openness of the political system inhibit corruption. That is, to the extent to 
which aspiring politicians can enter and gain financial backing, to which voters can focus their 
votes on policies and thereby hold incumbent politicians accountable for policy outcomes and find 
substitutes for them if dissatisfied with those outcomes, corruption as a general problem of agency 
is reduced. Many of these institutional effects can be estimated in the presence of controls for 
variables representing other approaches. We do not intend to dismiss the historical-structural 
emphasis on at least urban context and education, as well as the public choice focus on rent-seeking, 
government scale and salaries, and the inefficient activities of interest groups. Indeed, our results 
support those claims, yet the effects of institutions show up independently. In fact, some effects are 
clear only in the presence of a full set of controls, so it is important to think of the choice among the 
six approaches we review as not necessarily either-or. 
Looking at the corruption results we present is another lens through which to admire 
Mancur Olson’s enormous contribution to the social sciences. Olson wrote about the pervasive 
dangers of having interest groups that should be competing instead be embedded in the political 
process. He wrote about excessive regulation as a threat to entry and innovation as well as an 
opportunity for excessive rent-seeking. And he was concerned about promoting competition among 
politicians and with the circumstances in which newly-formed governments could gain credibility 
with their populations. Since his work is more widely cited throughout political science than any 




variables whose inclusion can be traced back to an argument of Olson’s. At the same time we have 
to be clear that though he certainly was interested in the effect of institutions on the performance of 
social, political, and economic systems, Olson was less concerned to analyze institutions as 
creations of strategic individuals. Thus the insights that come from a political agency approach – 
and another “conclusions” of this paper is that such an approach is valuable for studying corruption 
– lie largely outside his work. 
Nor does our work stop here. We believe that the agency approach and the variables it 
specifies, especially those that relate to institutions creating conditions for more open electoral 
competition, will stand up to further empirical scrutiny. But other approaches, and other 
institutional effects, are sure to be found. To take a simple example that relates to where our own 
work will go next, among the many variables that did not appear significant as we worked our way 
through what is now Table 2 were divided government (different parties controlling different 
branches of state government), which seemed to be weakly associated with lower corruption, and 
having elected (as opposed to appointed) state supreme court judges, that also tended to reduce 
corruption, but not significantly. However, we find that including also an interaction term of elected 
judges and divided government makes the other two have linear terms with strongly significant 
negative signs, while the interaction is significantly positive. Therefore, one can think of elected 
judges and divided government as substitutes. This means that the effect of elected judges in 
reducing corruption is smaller where there is divided government. Or, put differently, elected judges 
are more important where there is unified government, that is, when government “cannot control 
itself” because the checking effect of another party sharing power, with incentives to disclose (at 
least unshared) corruption, is absent. So this paper will be the first, but by no means the last, on 
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Appendix: Data sources 
 
Variable    Source 
 
Corruption survey    Boylan and Long (2002) 
Per cent metropolitan population  http://www.census.gov 
Real per capita income     Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Per cent with high school diploma  http://www.census.gov 
Real government revenue per capita  Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Initiatives      Hug (2001) and Tolbert et al. (1999) 
Term limits      Besley and Case (1995) and http://www.termlimits.org 
Electoral competition    Holbrook and van Dunk (1993) 
Primaries      Book of the States, various years 
Campaign spending restrictions  Book of the States, various years 
Fiscal transparency index    Alt, Lassen and Skilling (2002) 
Per cent with Scandinavian ancestry  http://www.census.org 
States with Progressive Governor Gillespie (1993) 
Average salary of state government  Statistical Abstract of the United States 
  employees relative to state personal 
  income per capita 
Small Business Survival Index  http://www.sbsc.org 
Government employees per 100  Statistical Abstract of the United States 









Table 1: Core regression of corruption in American states, 1990s 
 
 survey 
metropolitan population (in %)  .0414*** 
(.0073) 
real income per capita  -.0003** 
(.0001) 
% of population with high school diploma  -.1012*** 
(.0240) 




Number of observations  45 
R
2 .57 








1 Stat. gub. term limits 0,378 0,287 0,196 0,59
2 Political competition -0,013 0,015 0,376 0,58
3 Open primaries -0,477 0,256 0,070 0,60
4 Initiatives -1,114 0,523 0,040 0,62
Initiatives threshold 0,142 0,061 0,025
5 Av. use of initiatives -0,221 0,063 0,001 0,64
6 Direct initiatives -1,975 0,610 0,003
Direct initiatives thr. 0,304 0,089 0,002 0,67
Indirect initiatives 0,551 1,597 0,732
Indirect initiatives thr. -0,094 0,145 0,520
7 Campaign spending restrictions -0,602 0,247 0,019 0,61
8 No. of interest groups, 1997 0,001 0,001 0,335 0,58
9 Conc. of interest groups, 1997 21,208 21,496 0,330 0,58
10 Federal revenues -4,516 3,147 0,159 0,58
11 Decentralization of state rev. -2,607 1,757 0,146 0,59
12 Relative gov. empl. salary -2,002 0,649 0,004 0,62
13 Government employees 0,049 0,016 0,003 0,60
14 Small Business Survival Index 0,008 0,010 0,420 0,57
15 Fiscal transparency 0,115 0,073 0,122 0,59
16 % Scandinavian ancestry -0,039 0,007 0,000 0,65
17 Progressive governor -1,031 0,185 0,000 0,61
Dependent variable: State house reporters' perception of corruption, 1999
All regressions included a constant term and as control variables share of metropolitan
population, real income per capita, share of population with high school diploma, and 









Table 3: Corruption in American states, full model 
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Political competition    -.005 
(.011) 
  
Term limits    .263 
(.260) 
  
















Small Business Survival Index        .025*** 
(.009) 










number of observations  45  45  45  45 
R
2  .74 .75 .77 .83 
Note: ***,** and * denote significance at 99 %, 95 % and 90 % levels, respectively. 
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